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HE Survey period for 2002 yielded several significant cases, in-
cluding a few landmark decisions. For example, the Texas Su-
preme Court ended the debate over whether claims can be
asserted against a liability insurer under Texas Insurance Code, article
21.21 for the insurer's mishandling of third party claims-a debate fueled
in part by the court's prior holdings in American Physicians Insurance
Exchange v. Garcia' and Maryland Insurance Co. v. Head Industrial
Coatings & Services, Inc.2 The supreme court also surprised many in the
insurance industry with its holding in King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co.,3
deciding that a negligent hiring claim against an employer can constitute
an "occurrence" under a CGL policy, even if the plaintiff's injuries re-
sulted from an employee's intentional misconduct. The court refused to
follow Fifth Circuit precedent to the contrary.
While several decisions clarified certain issues, other opinions further
muddied already murky water with respect to other issues. For example,
during last year's Survey period, the Austin Court of Appeals held that
damages from a builder's defective construction arose from intentional
1. Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).
2. Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Indst. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1996) (per
curiam).
3. King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2002).
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acts and did not constitute an "occurrence." '4 During this year's Survey
period, however, the Austin court retreated from its decision in Devoe
and held that a home builder's construction of faulty foundations consti-
tuted an "occurrence." 5 Also, Texas appellate courts remain divided as to
whether an insured is entitled to recover under a Texas standard automo-
bile policy damages for inherent diminution in value to the insured vehi-
cle, in addition to costs of repair.6
It would not be surprising if several of the cases discussed in this Sur-
vey were discussed in future decisions of the Texas Supreme Court. Sev-
eral cases to watch include Herrin v. Medical Protective Co. 7 and the
diminution in value cases.
I. EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. DuTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
1. Article 21.21 Provides a Private Cause of Action for an Insurer's
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices
a. Recognition of Cause of Action Under Article 21.21
In Rocor International, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,8 the
Texas Supreme Court held that article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code
gives an insured a private cause of action against its liability insurer for
unfair practices in settling third-party claims. Rocor involved an automo-
bile accident caused by a Rocor employee who was operating a company
truck under the influence of alcohol. The truck struck and killed two
highway patrol officers; the families of the officers sued Rocor.9
After investigating the families' allegations, Rocor and its attorney de-
termined that the company would likely be found liable for the officers'
deaths. Rocor's attorney, Terrence Martin, began settlement negotiations
with the attorney representing the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' attorney,
Charles Soechting, told Martin as early as June 1989, that he believed the
case was worth the combined limits of Rocor's primary and excess poli-
cies. Rocor's coverage consisted of a $1 million primary policy, with a $1
million self-insured retention endorsement, and an $8 million umbrella
policy issued by National Union. The parties agreed to mediate the case
in January 1990.10
4. Devoe v. Great Am. Ins., 50 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.).
5. CU Lloyd's of Tex. v. Main St. Homes, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, no pet.).
6. See Schaefer v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 65 S.W.3d 806 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2002, pet. granted); Smither v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 76 S.W.3d 719 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. filed); Bailey v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co.,
78 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. filed).
7. Herrin v. Med. Protective Co., 89 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet.
filed).
8. Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2002).




Before the mediation, Rocor advised National Union that the exposure
would likely reach the umbrella policy. National Union then exercised its
contractual right to control the settlement negotiations." Neither the
primary policy nor National Union's umbrella policy included a duty to
defend. Therefore, while National Union was entitled to control the set-
tlement negotiations, Rocor remained responsible for the continuing
costs of defense. After assuming control of the settlement negotiations,
National Union cancelled the scheduled mediation and informed the
plaintiffs that no settlement offer was open. National Union's attorney,
Stanley Renneker, replaced Martin as Rocor's defense counsel.' 2
Once National Union assumed control of the settlement negotiations,
offers passed between the parties over a period of fourteen months. Only
one of the plaintiffs' settlement demands was ever presented in writing.
That demand was for $10 million. Renneker and National Union viewed
the demand merely as an attempt to "Stower-ize" National Union rather
than a realistic demand)3
Soechting had previously made an oral settlement demand of $4.5 mil-
lion. Renneker believed that the offer was for all claims against the in-
sured and recommended that National Union accept it. Soechting
testified, however, that this demand was intended to settle only the adult
plaintiffs' claims and that he wanted an additional $1.8 million for the
children's claims. Thus, while Renneker believed the demand for all
plaintiffs was $4.5 million, Soechting intended the combined demand for
all plaintiffs to be $6.3 million.14
Approximately one year after National Union took over the settlement
negotiations, it settled the children's claims for $1.8 million. Several
months later, National Union settled the adult plaintiffs' claims for $4.6
million. After all claims were settled, Rocor sued National Union for
attorney's fees and costs incurred during National Union's extended ne-
gotiations with the plaintiffs.' 5
Rocor alleged that National Union negligently handled the claims by
failing to settle all claims a year earlier when Soechting would have ac-
cepted $6.3 million. Rocor contended that this delay was unreasonable
and unnecessarily exposed it to another year of expenses. Rocor specifi-
cally asserted that National Union violated article 21.21 of the Texas In-
surance Code by failing to accept a reasonable settlement offer within its
policy limits.16 Rocor successfully tried its case against National Union to
a jury, which found that the insurer was negligent and knowingly engaged
in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance. Na-
tional Union then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, con-
tending that Rocor could not maintain common law negligence or article
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 256-57.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 257.
16. Id. at 263.
1786 [Vol. 56
INSURANCE LAW
21.21 causes of action against National Union based on its handling of a
third-party claim. The trial court granted National Union's motion. 17
Rocor subsequently appealed the trial court's judgment to the San
Antonio Court of Appeals. A divided court of appeals reversed the trial
court's judgment and rendered judgment for Rocor on its negligence
claims. 18 Three justices concluded that Rocor could assert both claims of
negligence and violations of article 21.21 against its insurer. Two justices
believed that Rocor could recover only for common law negligence. Fi-
nally, two justices dissented, maintaining that Rocor should not recover
against its insurer under either theory. Both Rocor and National Union
filed petitions for review with the Texas Supreme Court. 19
For the first time, the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether an in-
sured is entitled to assert a claim against its liability insurer under article
21.21 for the insurer's handling of third-party claims. The supreme court
rejected National Union's argument (and the suggestion from prior opin-
ions issued by the supreme court) that such claims are restricted to first-
party insurance claims. The supreme court recognized the cause of action
and defined the standard of liability under the statute. 20
b. Scope of Article 21.21
The supreme court found that article 21.21 permits "any person" to
bring an action under the statute for damage caused by "another's" en-
gaging in practice prohibited by the statute.2' The supreme court noted
that the legislature intended for article 21.21 to "'comprehensively regu-
late and prohibit deceptive insurance practices.'"22 Instead of proscrib-
ing what is a deceptive insurance practice, section 16(a) allows insureds to
pursue claims for practices that the State Board of Insurance has declared
unfair in its rules or regulations. 23 The supreme court found that State
Board of Insurance Order No. 18,66324 prohibits unfair or deceptive prac-
tices "as defined by the provisions of the Insurance Code. ' 25 The su-
preme court held that the broad prohibition on any deceptive practices
under the Code encompassed activities prohibited under article 21.21-2,
which identifies as unfair an insurer's "'[n]ot attempting in good faith to
effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims submitted in
which liability has become reasonably clear." 26 While no private cause
of action exists under article 21.21-2, the supreme court stated that the
effect of the Board Order 18,993 was to make unfair claims settlement
17. Id. at 257.
18. Id. at 257-58.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 258-60.
21. Id.. at 258 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
22. Id. (citing Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 385 (Tex. 2000) (quoting
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Tex. 1998))).
23. Id.
24. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3 (West 2003).
25. Rocor Int'l, Inc., 77 S.W.3d at 258.
26. Id. (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
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practices under article 21.21-2 actionable under article 21.21.27 Citing its
prior opinion in Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the
court held that the insured was entitled to assert a claim against the in-
surer under article 21.21.28
National Union argued that Vail did not support Rocor's article 21.21
claim because it was limited to first party insurance claims. National
Union relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in American Physi-
cians Insurance Exchange v. Garcia,29 which involved a claim against a
liability insurer for failing to settle a medical malpractice claim against its
insured. The plaintiffs asserted a common law Stowers claim against the
insurer, as well as statutory claims under article 21.21 and the DTPA. On
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Vail supported their statutory causes of
action against the insurer. The supreme court disagreed, stating:
Vail, however, involved an insurer's bad faith refusal to pay a claim
under a first-party property insurance policy. A Stowers action, by
definition, involves an insurer's duty to settle a covered lawsuit-a
situation that can only arise under a third-party liability insurance
policy. Thus Vail is inapposite.30
Dismissing National Union's argument that Vail did not support
Rocor's article 21.21 claim, the supreme court stated that nothing in its
prior opinions "indicates that [the court] intended to limit an insured's
statutory claims against its own insurer for unfair claim settlement prac-
tices to first-party insurance claims, and neither was necessary to our de-
cision. ' 31 Concurring, Justice Hecht argued: "Plainly, Garcia limited
Vail's applicability to first-party claims. This limitation is consistent with
Vail's alternative holding that article 21.21 makes actionable a breach of
the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. That duty covers
only first-party claims."'32 Justice Hecht contends that it "would be better
to simply overrule Garcia as wrong than to pretend as if its words mean
nothing." 33
c. The Statutory Liability Standard: "Reasonably Clear" Liability
Next, the supreme court addressed the statutory criteria for bringing a
third-party claim under article 21.21. The supreme court noted that arti-
cle 21.21 imposes liability on an insurer if the insurer does not "'attempt
in [ ] good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
claims submitted ... in which liability has become reasonably clear.'" 34
27. Id. at 258-59 (citing Vail v. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.
1988)).
28. Id. at 260 (citing Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 133-34).
29. Id. at 259 (citing Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 845).
30. Id. at 266 (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 260.
32. Id. at 266.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 260 (alteration in original).
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The supreme court then analyzed what constitutes "reasonably clear" lia-
bility under the statute.
The supreme court first noted that the Insurance Code does not iden-
tify situations when liability is "reasonably clear" such that an insurer
may be subject to liability for failing to reasonably or promptly settle a
claim.35 National Union argued in favor of applying the common law
Stowers test to the statute. The supreme court agreed and held that the
Stowers test would provide an "appropriate framework. '36 The supreme
court noted that "[a]pplying the familiar common law standard promotes
uniformity and prevents insurers from facing conflicting liability stan-
dards for failing to settle lawsuits filed by injured third-party claim-
ants."'37 Thus, the supreme court held that that the following elements
must be satisfied in order to trigger an insurer's statutory duty to reasona-
bly attempt settlement of a third-party claim against the insured:
1) The policy must cover the claim;
2) The insured's liability must be reasonably clear;
3) The claimant must make a proper settlement demand within policy
limits; and
4) The demand's terms must be such that an ordinarily prudent insurer
would accept it.38
Since National Union did not dispute coverage, or argue that the in-
sured's liability was not reasonably clear, the court found that the first
two elements of the 21.21 liability standard were satisfied. 39 National
Union maintained that Rocor's claim must fail nevertheless because there
was no evidence that the plaintiffs made a proper settlement demand
within policy limits such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would have
accepted.40
d. "Proper Settlement Demand" Required
The supreme court noted that, in some jurisdictions, an insurer may
incur tort liability for failing to settle even if the third-party claimant had
not made a firm settlement offer.41 However, the supreme court con-
firmed that Texas law "imposes no duty on an insurer to accept a settle-
ment demand in excess of policy limits or to make or solicit settlement
proposals. ' 42 Accordingly, the supreme court held that "an insurer's stat-
utory duty to reasonably attempt settlement of a third-party claim against
its insured is not triggered until the claimant has presented the insurer
with a proper settlement demand within policy limits that an ordinarily
35. Id.
36. Id. at 260-61.
37. Id. at 261.
38. Id. at 262.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 261.




prudent insurer would have accepted. '43 The supreme court stated that a
"proper settlement demand" at a minimum "must clearly state a sum cer-
tain and propose to fully release the insured. 44
The supreme court found that proper settlement demand was not
presented to National Union and, therefore, National Union was not lia-
ble to Rocor under article 21.21. The supreme court based its decision on
the fact that the record indicated confusion over the plaintiffs' settlement
demand. The only demand in writing was for $10,000,000. Since the
claim was ultimately settled for less than $10,000,000, National Union
could not be liable for rejecting this demand. Because the plaintiffs' at-
torney did not clearly communicate his settlement demand to National
Union, the supreme court found that a proper demand had not been
made. The supreme court stated that to be a proper settlement demand,
the settlement terms must be clear and undisputed. 45 Although a formal
written settlement demand does not appear to be required, in light of the
court's decision, plaintiffs' attorneys would be wise to present their de-
mands in writing so that there is no confusion as to the terms of the pro-
posed settlement.
e. Liability Absent a Duty to Defend
National Union argued that it could not be liable for Rocor's defense
costs because it did not owe Rocor a duty to defend under the umbrella
policy. In support of this position, National Union suggested that the
Stowers duty is "premised upon the insurer's control of the insured's de-
fense."'46 The supreme court disagreed, stating that its decision in Stowers
also was premised upon the insurer's control over settlements. 47 The su-
preme court pointed out that Rocor was not seeking recovery of its attor-
neys' fees as a measure of contractual damages, but as tort damages.48
The Rocor decision is significant because, for the first time, the Texas
Supreme Court extended its holding in Vail to third-party liability poli-
cies. Texas law now recognizes a statutory duty on the part of liability
insurers to settle claims by third parties against their insureds once liabil-
ity becomes reasonably clear. The standard for liability under article
21.21 is the same as the common law duty imposed by the Stowers doc-
trine. The insurer must accept a demand to settle a covered claim within
the limits of the insurance policy if the insured's liability is reasonably
clear and the terms of the demand are such that an ordinarily prudent
insurer would accept it. The duty does not include the duty to solicit
settlement demands. Moreover, a proper demand must be clearly com-
municated such that the proposed settlement terms are clear and
undisputed.
43. Id. (citing Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 849).
44. Id. (citing Garcia, 876 S.W.2d at 849).
45. Id. at 263.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 264.
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2. Rocor Liability Standard Applies to Article 21.21, § 4(10)
Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston General Insurance Co.49 repre-
sents one of the first applications of the Texas Supreme Court's Rocor
decision. In this case the insured, Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. (Chickasha),
sought defense coverage from Houston General for various toxic tort
lawsuits involving pollution of the air, ground, and water in Commerce,
Texas. The pollution allegedly resulted from cotton waste incineration by
a gin Chickasha owned from 1962 to 1969. Chickasha sought coverage
under policies that had been issued to its predecessor by Houston Gen-
eral's predecessor. The policies consisted of comprehensive general lia-
bility coverage from 1946 to 1986, as well as umbrella policies issued
between 1972 and 1986. Neither Chickasha nor Houston General could
locate any of the policies issued before 1972. Moreover, only some of the
post-1972 policies were identified and those policies contained pollution
exclusions. Houston General denied coverage under all policies.50
Chickasha filed this declaratory judgment action seeking both defense
and indemnity coverage. Chickasha also asserted contractual and extra-
contractual claims, including a claim for alleged violations of Texas Insur-
ance Code article 21.21.51 Chickasha claimed that it had spent over $7
million dollars defending and settling the claims.5 2 The parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Houston General, dismissing with prejudice all of
Chickasha's claims. Chickasha appealed.5 3
The Dallas Court of Appeals first addressed whether Chickasha had
presented sufficient evidence of coverage to preclude summary judgment
against it.s 4 Finding that the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Houston General on the coverage issues, the court then
considered whether summary judgment on the extra-contractual claims
was erroneous. One issue was whether Chickasha had asserted a viable
claim against Houston General under section 4(10) of article 21.21. At
the time the appeal was filed, the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Rocor55 had not yet been issued. Relying on pre-Rocor precedent, Hous-
ton General asserted that the 21.21 claims "are not available to Chicka-
sha as to the third-party underlying claims here under controlling Texas
case law."'5 6 Houston General cited Maryland Insurance Co. v. Head In-
dustrial Coatings & Services, Inc. for the proposition that "the insured's
rights against its insurer for the insurer's settlement practices were lim-
49. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., No. 05-00-01789-CV (Tex.
App.-Dallas Aug. 6, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) 2002 WL 1792467.
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *2.
54. Id. at *4-5.
55. Id. at *8.
56. Id. at *7.
20031
SMU LAW REVIEW
ited to the rights under the Stowers doctrine. '57 The court of appeals
noted that, at the time Maryland Insurance Co. was filed, "article 21.21
did not include section 4(10), which permits an insured to bring a cause of
action against an insurer for unfair settlement practices. '58
Chickasha asserted a claim under section 4(10)(ii) of article 21.21,
which defines as an unfair settlement practice "failing to attempt in good
faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim with
respect to which the insurer's liability has become reasonably clear." 59
The court concluded that, although the Texas Supreme Court in Rocor
interpreted article 21.21 as it existed before section 4(10) was added, its
holding was applicable to claims based on section 4(10)(ii) because lan-
guage interpreted in Rocor was "virtually identical to the language in sec-
tion 4(10)(ii)."60 Thus, the court held that, in order to assert a claim
under section 4(10)(ii), the insured "must show that (1) the policy covers
the claim, (2) the insured's liability is reasonably clear, (3) the claimant
has made a proper settlement demand within policy limits, and (4) the
demand's terms are such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept
it."61
Houston General argued that Chickasha's claim under section 4(10)(ii)
should fail as a matter of law because there was no evidence demonstrat-
ing that "coverage for the underlying claims was 'reasonably clear." 62
The court rejected this argument stating that "[r]easonable clarity of cov-
erage is not one of the elements under Rocor and section 4(10)(ii)."63
The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Houston General. 64
3. Tort Claims for Non-Renewal of Policy
In Herrin v. The Medical Protective Co.,65 the insured, Bob J. Herrin,
M.D., sued his malpractice carrier, The Medical Protective Company, and
his insurance broker, as a result of the insurer's failure to renew his medi-
cal malpractice insurance. Herrin claimed that the non-renewal of his
malpractice coverage occurred after he consented to settle a surgical mal-
practice claim against him. He further claimed that he was induced into
giving his consent to the settlement by representations that the settlement
would not affect his coverage. Specifically, he alleged that he accepted
the settlement only after Chuck Curtice, Medical's general agent, assured
him that the settlement was "nothing unusual" and that it "would have no
57. Id. (citing Md. Ins. Co., 938 S.W.2d at 28-29).
58. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 4(10), 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002)).
59. Id. at *8 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(10)(ii) (Vernon Supp.
2002)).
60. Id.




65. Herrin, 89 S.W.3d at 304.
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effect on his relationship with Medical."'66 Herrin alleged that Curtice
implied the settlement would not result in cancellation or non-renewal of
his coverage.
In spite of Curtice's alleged assurances, subsequent to the settlement,
Medical refused to renew Herrin's policy, citing "'claim and suit fre-
quency and severity." 67 This determination was made in spite of Her-
rin's long-standing relationship with Medical and the fact that only a few
claims had been made against him over a very long career. Evidence was
also presented that field personnel, including Curtice, had recommended
that Medical renew the policy. After the non-renewal of his coverage,
Herrin was unable to find sufficient liability coverage and had to prema-
turely retire from the practice of medicine.68 Herrin then filed suit
against Medical alleging "common law fraud, breach fiduciary duty, viola-
tions of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") and the
Texas Insurance Code, and breach of contract. '69
The trial court granted Medical's motion for summary judgment on all
Herrin's claims.70 Herrin appealed the summary judgment arguing that
genuine issues of material fact were raised concerning all of his allega-
tions against Medical.71
The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's summary
judgment, holding that Herrin had raised sufficient fact issues to support
all of his allegations, except for his breach of contract claim.72 The
court's analysis regarding Herrin's fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
bad faith claims is particularly noteworthy.
a. Fraud
Medical argued that Herrin failed to present any evidence in support of
the intent element of his fraud claim. Specifically, Medical maintained
"that to have a legal basis for fraud, Curtice would have had to have
known that Medical would drop Herrin's coverage at the time he recom-
mended Herrin settle" the malpractice claim.73 Disagreeing, the court
stated that "the intent element of common law fraud requires that he
know or should have known. '74 The court found that evidence establish-
ing Curtice's awareness of Medical's policy to review "an insured's claims
history to consider nonrenewal when a claim in excess of $100,000 is
paid" created an issue of material fact as to whether Curtice knew or




69. Id. at 303-04.
70. Id. at 304.
71. Id. at 305, 307, 309-11.
72. Id. at 312.
73. Id. at 306.
74. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy,




also found there was sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue regarding the
other elements of the fraud claim. 76
b. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Bad Faith
The court also considered whether Herrin presented sufficient evi-
dence on his claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. First, the court noted that Herrin based his
fiduciary duty claim on the existence of an informal fiduciary relationship
rather than a formal fiduciary relationship.77 The court stated:
Informal fiduciary relationships may arise in circumstances "where a
special confidence is reposed in another who in equity and good con-
science is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the inter-
ests of the one reposing confidence." Whether an informal fiduciary
relationship exists is typically determined by a trier of fact because
those relationships hinge on the surrounding circumstances
Certain "special relationships" give rise to a tort duty of good faith
and fair dealing. The common law duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing does not exist in all contractual relationships. The duty only
arises when a contract creates or governs a special relationship be-
tween the parties. A fiduciary duty encompasses at the very mini-
mum a duty of good faith and fair dealing, but the converse is not
true. The duty of good faith and fair dealing merely requires the
parties to "deal fairly" with one another and does not require the
high standard of trust present in a fiduciary relationship.78
The court found that Herrin's summary judgment evidence was suffi-
cient to raise a fact issue regarding the existence of an informal fiduciary
relationship as well as a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Specifically,
the court relied on deposition testimony from Curtice indicating that he
knew and worked with Herrin for approximately fifteen years and on
Herrin's testimony that he trusted Curtice's advise concerning the settle-
ment because of the nature of their long-standing relationship. 79 The
court found that a provision in the insurance policy requiring Herrin's
consent to settle a claim was "further summary judgment proof that Med-
ical was under a duty of good faith and fair dealing."'80
It could be argued that this decision opens the door to a new theory of
extra-contractual claims against liability carriers. In Maryland Insurance
Co., the Texas Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, refused to
recognize a cause of action for bad faith against a liability insurer for
failing to "investigate and defend claims by a third party against its in-
sured." 81 The lower court in Maryland Insurance Co. "reasoned that a
duty of good faith and fair dealing arises because of the special relation-
76. Id. at 307.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 308-09.
80. Id. at 309.
81. Md. Ins. Co., 938 S,W.2d at 27.
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ship between insurer and insured, and because of the insurer's superior
position in that relationship. '8 2 This reasoning is similar to the reasoning
expressed by the Herrin court.
An attempt to distinguish Herrin from Maryland Insurance Co. can be
made based on the perspective that the alleged breach of duty in Herrin
occurred when the policy was not renewed and therefore did not involve
the handling of third party claims as in Maryland Insurance Co. In Mary-
land Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court held: "[A]n insured is fully
protected against his insurer's refusal to defend or mishandling of a third-
party claim by his contractual and Stowers rights. Imposing an additional
duty on insurers in handling third-party claims is unnecessary and there-
fore inappropriate. '83 Viewed from another perspective, however, it
could be argued that the breach of duty in Herrin did involve the han-
dling of a third party claim. The basis for Herrin's claims against Medical
was not solely the nonrenewal of his malpractice coverage, but also the
alleged statements made to induce him to provide his consent to the set-
tlement of a third party claim. It is also interesting that the court stated,
without qualification or limitation, that the existence of a consent-to-set-
tle clause in the policy created a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 84
It should be noted that a petition for review by the Texas Supreme
Court was filed December 12, 2002. Unless reversed or clarified by the
supreme court, it is foreseeable that insureds may attempt to rely on the
Herrin opinion as a substitute for traditional common law bad faith
claims, proscribed by Maryland Insurance Co., by seeking to establish ex-
tra-contractual liability against liability insurers based on the alleged exis-
tence of an informal fiduciary duty. Such an alleged duty might be
argued to exist based on the relationship the insured has with its insur-
ance agent or on the reliance and confidence placed by the insured in a
claims handler. Moreover, insureds under policies containing consent-to-
settle clauses, common in professional liability policies, might attempt to
rely on Herrin to support a common law bad faith claim. Such claims,
however, to the extent they involve the duty to defend or the mishandling
of third party claims, seem contrary to Maryland Insurance Co.
4. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Does Not Extend Beyond
Judgment Against Insurer
In Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Boyte,85 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether an "insurer's common law and stat-
utory duties of good faith and fair dealing extend beyond entry of judg-
ment in favor of its insured." This case arose in 1992 when the insured,
Randy Boyte, was involved in a car accident. Boyte made a claim against
82. Id. at 28.
83. Id. at 28-29.
84. Herrin, 89 S.W.3d at 309.




his insurer, Mid-Century, for personal injury protection ("PIP") and also
asserted a liability claim against the other driver. Boyte filed suit against
the other driver, and that driver's carrier tendered its policy limits of
$100,000 to Boyte. Boyte then added Mid-Century to the underlying law-
suit asserting claims for UIM benefits.
In 1995, Mid-Century determined that Boyte's UIM claim was worth
$120,000 and tendered $20,000, which was the difference after subtracting
the settlement with the other driver. Because Boyte needed additional
medical treatment, his claims against Mid-Century for the remaining pol-
icy limits proceeded to trial.86 The jury found that Boyte was entitled to
the remaining $80,000 available under the Mid-Century policy, and Mid-
Century appealed the judgment. After the judgment, Boyte informed
Mid-Century that he was in need of back surgery and that he could not
afford it.87 Despite the $80,000 judgment for Boyte, Mid-Century only
offered to pay $23,400 for Boyte's back surgery and therapy because the
appeal was pending. Boyte declined this offer, and Mid-Century did not
pay the $80,000 until 1998, after the Fort Worth Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's judgment and the Texas Supreme Court denied
review.
As a result of Mid-Century's delay in settling his claim, Boyte sued
Mid-Century for bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the
Insurance Code and the DTPA. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury
found that Mid-Century knowingly failed to attempt to effectuate a
prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of Boyte's claim when it knew or
should have known that its liability was reasonably clear. 88 Mid-Century
appealed arguing, among other things, that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing does not extend beyond judgment. Specifically, Mid-Century al-
leged that "it and Boyte [were] no longer in an insurer-insured relation-
ship but that they [were] in a judgment debtor-judgment creditor
relationship since Boyte obtained a judgment against Mid-Century." 89 In
support of its argument, Mid-Century relied on Stewart Title Guarantee
Co. v. Aiello,90 in which "[tihe Texas Supreme Court held that an insur-
ance company does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing on a
claim when the claim has already been settled by both parties." 91 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment finding that the facts
were distinguishable from Aiello because the agreed judgment in Aiello
was subject to immediate execution, while the judgment in this case was
superseded pending Mid-Century's appeal. 92
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Boyte, 49 S.W.3d 408,411 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001), rev'd, 80 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
89. Id. at 413.
90. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 70-72 (Tex. 1997).




The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' holding. In
reaching its decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that the facts in this
case were not distinguishable from Aiello. In particular, the Texas Su-
preme Court noted, "Like the agreed judgment in Aiello, Mid-Century's
UIM judgment called only for payment of a sum of money to Boyte. '93
The supreme court held that the parties' relationship was transformed
from one of insurer-insured to judgment creditor-judgment debtor upon
the trial court's entry of judgment.94 The supreme court explained that
"an insurer's duty of good faith 'arises because of the disparity of bar-
gaining power inherent in the insurer-insured relationship,"' which "'sim-
ply [does] not arise in the judgment creditor-judgment debtor
context."95 The supreme court held that Boyte, like the Aiellos, was not
"vulnerable, [because he] had access to a number of enforcement reme-
dies."'96 Thus, the supreme court held that Boyte had no bad faith cause
of action based on Mid-Century's post-judgment conduct because the
judgment extinguished Mid-Century's duty of good faith.97
B. PROMPT PAYMENT ACT (ARTICLE 21.55)
In Wellisch v. United Services Automobile Ass'n.,98 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals rejected the insureds' contention that their underin-
sured motorist (UIM) carrier violated Texas Insurance Code article 21.55
by waiting to pay their claim until a jury determined damages. The facts
of the underlying case stem from a car rollover while the driver, Judith
Salinas, was traveling at eighty miles per hour. Salinas was killed in the
rollover and her passengers were severely injured. One of her passen-
gers, fifteen-year-old Jessica Wellisch, was comatose after the accident
and died five days later. 99
Jessica Wellisch's parents sued Salinas's estate for wrongful death.
Before the case was tried, the Wellisches settled with Salinas's automo-
bile liability carrier for $1,000,000. The settlement was approved by the
Wellisches' UIM carrier, United Services Automobile Association
("USAA"). After the settlement, the Wellisches demanded that USAA
tender the $300,000 limit of their UIM policy. USAA refused, and the
Wellisches sued the insurer.100
"The trial court ordered separate trials on the Wellisches' contractual
and extracontractual claims."'' 1 Prior to the trial on the contractual lia-
bility, the Wellisches obtained partial summary judgment establishing
93. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex., 80 S.W.3d at 548.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 71).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 549.
98. Wellisch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 75 S.W.3d 53, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).





Salinas's negligence in the accident.102 After Salinas's negligence was es-
tablished, a jury trial was held on damages. The jury found in favor of the
Wellisches and awarded them $6 million in damages. On the same day
that the trial court entered the judgment, USAA tendered its full policy
limits.'0 3
The Wellisches then pursued their extra-contractual claims against
USAA for initially denying their claim. The Wellisches moved for sum-
mary judgment on their extra-contractual allegations, arguing that USAA
had violated the Texas Insurance Code's prompt payment provision
under article 21.55.104 USAA responded with its own motion for partial
summary judgment, contending that the Wellisches were not legally enti-
tled to their UIM policy benefits until the liability of the underinsured
motorist was established and the amount of the Wellisches' damages was
determined by the jury. 10 5 The trial court agreed and entered final judg-
ment in favor of USAA. The Wellisches appealed106
On appeal, the court held that an insurer is not obligated to pay UIM
benefits until the insured is entitled to them.107 The court also noted that,
while the Texas Insurance Code requires the prompt payment of claims,
"the statute is premised on the presumption that carriers have the right to
dispute claims."' 108 The court then addressed a line of cases relied on by
the Wellisches to support their argument. The court found that in each of
those cases the delay in payment was marked from the time a covered
event arose. 09 The court found that in the Wellisches' case there was no
covered event until the jury awarded damages to the Wellisches. There-
fore, the insurer did not violate Texas Insurance Code article 21.55 by
waiting to pay UIM benefits until the insureds' damages were determined
by the jury."10
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. CGL AND UMBRELLA POLICIES
1. "Occurrence"
a. Negligent Hiring
In the much-anticipated King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co.,' the Texas
Supreme Court held that a negligent hiring claim against an employer
could constitute an "occurrence" under a commercial general liability
(CGL) policy, despite the fact that the alleged injury resulted from an
102. Id. at 55-56.
103. Id. at 56.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 56, 58.
106. Id. at 56.
107. Id. at 57.
108. Id. (citing Dunn v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 991 S.W.2d 467,474 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1999, pet. denied)) .
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id.
111. King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 186 (Tex. 2002).
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employee's intentional conduct. In the underlying lawsuit, Carlisle King,
the insured, was sued both individually and doing business as "Tiedown
Construction Company" by Gregg Jankowiak. Jankowiak alleged that
one of King's employees attacked him while the two were working at a
common job site. Jankowiak claimed that King was negligent in hiring,
training, and supervising the attacker, Carlos Lopez. Jankowiak specifi-
cally alleged that King negligently failed to check Lopez's criminal back-
ground to determine his propensity for violence or to provide him with
training on how to properly respond to conflicts at work."12
After receiving each of Jankowiak's petitions, King forwarded them to
his CGL carrier, Dallas Fire Insurance Company. Dallas Fire in turn re-
fused to provide a defense, arguing that Jankowiak had not alleged an
"occurrence," which was defined in the policy as "'an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harm-
ful conditions."' 113 King then filed a declaratory judgment action. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the trial court
ruled in favor of Dallas Fire. King appealed, and the Houston Court of
Appeals for the First District affirmed. 114 King then appealed to the
Texas Supreme Court.
In analyzing whether the underlying lawsuit presented an occurrence
under King's policy, the supreme court noted that there are three possible
"standpoints" from which an injury-triggering event could be viewed:
"(1) the insured's, (2) the victim's, or (3) the actor's." 115 The supreme
court determined that the policy's language, prior precedent, and the his-
tory of the CGL policy all supported using the insured's standpoint to
determine whether there has been an "occurrence" that triggers the duty
to defend. 116
In conducting its analysis, the supreme court first looked to the lan-
guage of the policy, with particular interest in the "separation-of-in-
sureds" provision. The supreme court determined that this provision
effectively creates separate insurance policies for each insured.' 17 The
provision requires that the insureds be treated "'[a]s if each Named In-
sured were the only Named Insured."'118 As a result, the supreme court
concluded it was required to decide whether an "occurrence" had taken
place as if King were the only insured under the policy. 119
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court expressly rejected argu-
ments by amicus curiae in support of Dallas Fire contending that the sep-
aration-of-insureds clause evolved out of policy exclusions and should
112. Id. at 187.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000), rev'd, 85 S.W.3d 185, 186 (Tex. 2002)).
115. Id. at 188.
116. Id.
117. Id.




only apply to exclusionary clauses.' 20 The supreme court agreed with
Dallas Fire's supporters on the origins of the provision but found that the
current separation-of-insureds clause is not limited to exclusions. Moreo-
ver, the supreme court held that, if the policy's drafters did not intend for
the provision to apply to coverage under Section I of the CGL policy,
"they could have said so."'121
The supreme court also rejected Dallas Fire's argument that the hold-
ing in Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus man-
dated that coverage under an occurrence-based policy is determined by
the "injury-causing event," regardless of the separation-of-insureds provi-
sion.' 22 In McManus, the supreme court held that an exclusion for "inju-
ries caused by the 'ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or
unloading of a recreational motor vehicle away from the residence"' pre-
cluded defense coverage for a negligent entrustment claim.' 23 The su-
preme court stated that McManus, was inapposite because the exclusion
involved in that case did not have an intent element.' 24 The applicability
of the exclusion in that case could be determined without regard to the
insured's relationship to the event.
The court acknowledged that prior precedent from the Fifth Circuit
supported Dallas Fire's position; however, the supreme court stated that
the Fifth Circuit had not correctly interpreted Texas law.125 The supreme
court pointed to several of its prior opinions in support of this statement.
The supreme court first noted that, in Republic National Life Insurance
Co. v. Heyward, it held that the widow of a murder victim could recover
under a life insurance policy because the "test of whether the killing is
accidental within the terms of an insurance policy is not to be determined
by the viewpoint of the one who does the killing, but rather from the
viewpoint of the insured.' 26 The supreme court went on to hold that
even though these cases were not occurrence-based, they were relevant
because the ultimate issue is whose standpoint determines if there has
been an accident. 12 7
The supreme court also noted that its decision in Trinity Universal v.
Cowan was consistent with its application of the Heyward standard. 12 8 In
Cowan, the supreme court held that no coverage existed under a home-
owner's policy for an insured that made copies of a customer's revealing
photographs and distributed them to his friends. The supreme court
120. Id.
121. Id.




125. Id. at 191.
126. Id. at 189 (quoting Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 536 S.W.2d 549, 552
(Tex. 1976) (quoting Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 112 Tex. 551, 251 S.W. 491
(1923))).
127. Id.
128. Id. (discussing Trinity Universal v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1997)).
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found that this conduct was not accidental and, therefore, did not consti-
tute an occurrence. The court emphasized that, unlike the employer in
the present case, the "actor" committing the wrongdoing in Cowan was
the insured. 129
The supreme court expressly rejected contrary precedent from the
Fifth Circuit, stating that the Fifth Circuit had "erroneously" presumed to
interpret Texas law.130 The supreme court found that the Fifth Circuit
incorrectly "imputes the actor's intent to the insured.' 131 Instead, the
supreme court held that "whether one who contributes to an injury is
negligent is an inquiry independent from whether another who directly
causes the injury acted intentionally. ' 132
Finally, the supreme court suggested that the history of the CGL policy
supports its position. The supreme court pointed out that beginning in
1966 the standard forms of the CGL policy limited occurrences to acci-
dents "'expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured."1 33 In
1986 this definition was again revised. The 1986 revision removed the
language "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured" from
the definition of "occurrence" and reinserted the phrase as a standard
exclusion. 34 The supreme court held that, if it construed "occurrence" as
narrowly as Dallas Fire requested, there would be no need for a number
of typical exclusions, including those "covering assault and battery or sex-
ual misconduct.' 35
The supreme court ultimately held that, with respect to the employer,
the allegations of negligent hiring, supervision and training in the under-
lying petition alleged an "occurrence," regardless of the "actor's" inten-
tional conduct. The supreme court ruled that Dallas Fire had a duty to
defend.
b. Providing Incorrect Information about a Former Employee
In Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Lifecare Corp., the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals held that an insured's alleged negligence in providing
inaccurate information about a former employee to a subsequent em-
ployer constituted an "occurrence" under the insured's commercial gen-
eral liability (CGL) policy. 136 At one time, Gary Willis was employed by
Lifecare, the insured. Sometime after leaving Lifecare, Willis went to
work for Thomas Care Center (Thomas). Thomas contacted Lifecare to
obtain information on Willis's work history. Lifecare responded to the
129. Id. at 190.
130. Id. at 191.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 192 (quoting ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE
§ 117.1-.5 (2d ed. 2000)).
134. Id. (citing HOLMES, supra note 133, § 117.1).
135. Id. at 193.
136. Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Lifecare Corp., 89 S.W.3d 773, 784 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, no pet. h.).
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request for information, but gave Thomas "wrong information" about
Willis. 137 Subsequently, Willis sexually assaulted a woman while em-
ployed by Thomas. The injured woman, Davis, filed suit against both
Thomas and Lifecare. Davis alleged that Lifecare was negligent in failing
to exercise reasonable care in determining whether the information it
sent to Thomas was correct.138
Lifecare sought coverage for Davis's suit from its CGL insurers, Ac-
ceptance Insurance Company and Redland Insurance Company. The in-
surers denied coverage, contending there was no "occurrence" in light of
Willis's intentional acts. 139 Lifecare then filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against the insurers seeking a determination of coverage. After the
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that
coverage applied. The insurers appealed. 40
On appeal, the insurers argued that Davis' allegations did not consti-
tute an "occurrence" under "Coverage A" because the policy excluded
coverage for bodily injuries "expected or intended from the standpoint of
the insured."'1 41 The insurers further argued Lifecare's alleged negligence
was related and interdependent on Davis' intentional sexual assault based
upon Folsom Investments Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co.142
The court found Folsom to be distinguishable because, in that case, the
insured's conduct was alleged to be interrelated to that of its allegedly
abusive employee, based upon the insured's knowledge of the ongoing
abuse.143 Next, the court noted that Folsom was based exclusively on
Fifth Circuit precedent which had incorrectly interpreted Texas law. 144
The court recognized that this precedent was expressly rejected by the
Texas Supreme Court in King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co.'45 Thus, the
court found Folsom inapplicable. The court held that the claim against
Lifecare involved an "occurrence" under the policy because the insured
did not intend to injure Davis, and the term "occurrence" is "largely de-
termined by whether the activity was expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured.' 46
c. Construction Defects
CU Lloyd's of Texas v. Main Street Homes, Inc.147 involved claims
against an Austin home builder, Main Street Homes, Inc., by home pur-
chasers. The purchasers alleged that they observed defects resulting from
137. Id. at 777.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 776.
141. Id. at 778.
142. Id. (citing Folsom Invs., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 26 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2002, no pet.)).
143. Id. (citing Folsom Invs., Inc., 26 S.W.3d at 561).
144. Id. at 778-79 (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 1998)).
145. Id. at 780 (citing King, 85 S.W.3d at 191).
146. Id. at 784.
147. CU Lloyd's of Tex., 79 S.W.3d at 687.
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faulty foundations in homes they purchased from Main Street. They
claimed that Main Street received warnings that the foundations of the
homes, as designed, were inappropriate for the soil conditions and that
Main Street disregarded these warnings and knowingly proceeded with
construction.148 Some of the home purchasers further alleged that Main
Street relied on an inaccurate soil survey, which led to the deficient foun-
dation designs, and that Main Street knew the foundations were destined
to fail. Claims were asserted for "violations of the Texas Residential
Construction Liability Act, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, fraud,
breach of implied warranty, negligence and fraudulent conveyance.' ' 49
Main Street submitted the claims to its liability insurers. The insurers
refused to provide a defense, contending that the claims did not involve
an "occurrence" and the claims were excluded under the policies' busi-
ness risk exclusions. Coverage litigation ensued. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Main Street, holding that the insurers
owed Main Street a duty to defend. The insurers appealed. 15
0
The policies at issue provided coverage for "bodily injury" or "property
damage" caused by an "occurrence." Section I of both policies defined
"'occurrence" as "'an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to substantially the same general harmful conditions.'"151 The policies
did not define "accident.' '1 52
The court stated that the term "accident" as used in a general liability
policy "include[s] negligent acts of the insured causing damage which is
undesigned and unexpected."' 53 "However, when the action taken is an
intentional tort, there is no accident, regardless of whether the results are
unintended or unexpected.' 15 4 The court stated the rule as follows: "If
the tortfeasor's acts are deemed intentionally harmful, there is no acci-
dent, therefore no occurrence, no duty to defend, and no policy coverage.
However, if intentionally performed acts are not intended to cause harm
but do so because of negligent performance, a duty to defend arises."'' 5
5
With respect to those petitions alleging negligence claims, the court
held: "We need not determine whether the ... petition alleges an inten-
tional tort as the petition's allegations against Main Street include allega-
tions of negligence. Because at least one of the claims asserted in the...
petition potentially falls within the scope of coverage, [the insurers's]
duty to defend is triggered.' 56 This holding suggests that the court
viewed the mere presence of a negligence cause of action as sufficient to
allege an "occurrence." If, indeed, the court applied such a bright line
148. Id. at 690.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 691-92.
151. Id. at 692-93.
152. Id. at 693.




156. Id. at 694 (citations omitted).
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rule, the court's analysis is contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's holding
in Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin, which held that
"[a] court must focus on the factual allegations rather than the legal theo-
ries asserted in reviewing the underlying petition."'1 57
Regarding those petitions that did not include a cause of action for
negligence, the court noted the absence of allegations that Main Street
"intentionally designed the foundations to fail."' 158 The court found alle-
gations that "Main Street 'was aware, prior to the construction of the
foundations . .. that the slabs as designed would be inadequate,"' and
other similar allegations, insufficient to support the conclusion that the
claimant's damages did not result from an "accident.' 1 59 The court ap-
peared to focus on the fact the causes of action were not limited to "in-
tentional torts."
The court distinguished its prior holding in Devoe v. Great American
Insurance, in which it held that a contractor's deficient and substandard
construction of a home did not constitute an "accident" or an "occur-
rence" which could trigger coverage under a liability policy. 160 The court
commented that the present case differed from Devoe because, unlike
Devoe, the plaintiffs' claims were not restricted to shoddy
workmanship. 161
2. Business Risk Exclusions
After finding that the plaintiffs in CU Lloyd's of Texas had alleged an
"occurrence," the court addressed the insurers' argument that the allega-
tions were excluded under the business risk exclusions in the policies.
The insurers argued that the policies did not provide coverage "'for faulty
workmanship or for a contractor's failure to perform his contract"' and
that "'the business risk exclusions are designed to protect insurers from a
contractor's attempt to recover funds to correct deficiencies caused by the
contractor's questionable performance.' '1162
The court first addressed exclusion A.2.j.(5), which excludes coverage
for:
j. Damage to Property
"Property damage" to:
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any of
your contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly
on your behalf are performing operations, if the "property dam-
age" arises out of those operations .... 163
157. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffen, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997) (citing
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchs. Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex.
1997)).
158. CU Lloyd's of Tex., 79 S.W.3d at 694.
159. Id. (omission in original).
160. Id. at 695 (distinguishing Devoe v. Great Am. Ins., 50 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2001, no pet.)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 696.
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The court held that this exclusion was inapplicable because the allega-
tions in the petitions alleged that the plaintiffs purchased the homes after
Main Street completed construction. 164 Consequently, since Main Street
was not presently "performing operations," the exclusion did not apply.
Next the court considered exclusion A.2.j.(6). This exclusion precludes
coverage for:
j. Damage to Property
"Property damage" to:
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, re-
paired or replaced because "your work" was incorrectly per-
formed on it.
Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to "property dam-
age" included in the "products-completed operations hazard."'1 65
Because Main Street had completed and sold the homes before the
alleged damage; the court held that the damage fell within the products-
completed operations hazard.166 Therefore, the exception to exclusion
j.(6) was applicable.
The insurers also asserted exclusion A.2.k. as a basis for denial of cov-
erage for Main Street. Exclusion k excludes coverage for "[p]roperty
damage to 'your product' arising out of it or any part of it.' ' 167 The insur-
ers claimed that Main Street's homes were its "products." "[Y]our prod-
uct" was defined in the policies as "'goods or products ... manufactured,
sold, distributed, or disposed of .... 1168 It also included "[w]arranties or
representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, du-
rability, performance or use of 'your product,"' as well as "providing or
failing to provide warnings or instructions."'' 69 Citing Mid-United Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Providence Lloyds Insurance Co., Main Street argued that
the "definition of 'your product' [did] not apply to a building and its com-
ponents." The court agreed. 170
Finally, the court addressed the insurer's argument that exclusion A.2.1.
was applicable. Exclusion 1 excludes coverage to "'[p]roperty damage' to
'your work' arising out of it or any part of it and included in the 'prod-
ucts-completed operations hazard.'"171 However, the court noted that
this exclusion was subject to an exception "'if the damaged work or the
work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a
subcontractor.'" 72 The petitions at issue alleged that the property dam-
age was caused by Main Street's subcontractors who designed and con-
structed the foundations; therefore, the court held that the exclusion was
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 697.
167. Id. (alteration in original).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Mid-United Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Lloyds Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d
824, 826 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
171. Id. at 697-98.




3. Injury to Co-Employee
Zaiontz v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.174 involved a claim brought
by an employee, Zaiontz, against his employer, Bio Zapp Laboratories,
and Bio Zapp's president and majority shareholder, Michael Gershonsen,
for injuries Zaiontz received during the course and scope of his employ-
ment. Zaiontz was injured "while spraying Bio Zapp's 'Smoke and Fire
Odor Eliminator' in the interior of a smoke-damaged airplane.' t75
Zaiontz sued Bio Zapp, a non-subscriber of workers' compensation insur-
ance, and Gershonsen, alleging that his injuries resulted from Gershon-
sen's "negligence in preparing the 'Material Safety Data Sheet' that
Zaiontz relied upon in using the Smoke and Fire Odor Eliminator."'' 76
Bio Zapp possessed a primary CGL policy and a commercial excess/um-
brella policy. Coverage was denied under both polices. 177
At trial, Zaiontz recovered a judgment in excess of one million dollars
against Bio Zapp and Gershonsen. 78 Zaiontz sued Bio Zapp's liability
insurers to collect on the judgment. In the coverage lawsuit, the insurers
moved for summary judgment on the following grounds:
(1) the subject insurance policies exclude coverage for any injury to an
employee arising out of and in the course of employment by the
insured;
(2) the subject insurance policies exclude coverage arising out of pollu-
tion; and
(3) [Gershonsen] [was] not an insured under the policies.179
The trial court granted the insurers' motion for summary judgment on
only the first ground. Zaiontz and Gershonsen appealed, and the insurers
cross-appealed on the denial of their two other bases for summary
judgment.' 80
a. Employee Exclusion
On appeal, the insurers argued that the employee exclusions contained
in the policies excluded injuries suffered by Zaiontz from coverage.' 8'
The exclusions at issue precluded coverage for "'[bodily] injury' to: [a]n
employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment
by the insured."'1 82 In response, Zaiontz argued that based upon the sep-
aration-of-insureds clause, "the employee exclusion appli[ed] only if the
173. Id.
174. Zaiontz v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 87 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet.
denied).
175. Id. at 566.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 566-67.
178. Id. at 566.






insured who is actually seeking coverage under the policy is the claim-
ant's employer.' '' 183 The court agreed, holding that, because Gershon-
sen, the insured seeking coverage, was not Zaiontz's employee, the
exclusion did not apply.1 84
b. Definition of "Insureds"
Next, the court analyzed whether Gershonsen was an insured under the
primary CGL policy with respect to Zaiontz's allegations. The definition
of "insureds" provided that Bio Zapp's "executive officers and directors
are insureds, but only with respect to their duties as your officers or direc-
tors.1185 The policy further provided that the definition of "insureds"
included:
[Bio Zapp's] employees, other than [Bio Zapp's] executive officers,
but only for acts within the scope of their employment by [Bio
Zapp]. However, no employee is an insured for:
(1) "Bodily injury" or "personal injury" to [Bio Zapp] or to a co-
employee while in the course of his or her employment .... 186
Zaiontz argued that executive officers, like Gershonsen, are exempted
from the exclusionary language italicized above. The court disagreed,
stating that the exclusionary language applies to all employees and the
term "'employee' refers to 'one who works for another,"' including exec-
utive officers.187 Accordingly, the court held that Gershonsen was not
entitled to coverage under the primary CGL policy.188
4. Missing Policies
In Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston General Insurance Co.,189 dis-
cussed above, 190 the court addressed whether the insured provided Hous-
ton General with enough evidence to establish coverage under a number
of missing policies. The policies at issue were purchased by Chickasha's
predecessor from Houston General's predecessor.191 Neither party was
able to locate any of the Houston General liability policies issued to
Chickasha before 1972.192 Moreover, only some of the umbrella and gen-
eral liability policies issued by Houston General to Chickasha after 1972
183. Id. (citing Commercial Standard Ins. Co v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 455 S.W.2d 714
(Tex. 1970)).
184. Id. 567-68.
185. Id. at 569.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 570. The court held that Gershonsen was an insured under the umbrella
policy but that coverage under that exclusion was precluded by the policy's pollution exclu-
sion. See infra text accompanying notes 211-22.
189. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., No. 05-00-01789-CV (Tex.
App.-Dallas, Aug. 6, 2002) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 1792467.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 49-64.





The court of appeals noted that under Texas law a party seeking to
recover under an insurance policy has the burden of proving the terms of
the policy. 194 If a policy is unavailable, the insured may prove the terms
through secondary evidence, including specimen policies from the insurer
or mandatory policies from the Texas Department of Insurance. 195 The
court noted that Chickasha had provided both specimen policies from
Houston General and mandatory policies from the TDI as evidence of
the pre-1972 policies.' 96 Moreover, Chickasha submitted an affidavit
from a former employee involved in purchasing insurance who stated that
from as early as 1940 through 1972 Chickasha's policies were purchased
from Houston General. 97 The court held that the samples and the affi-
davit constituted "some evidence" of the policies and their terms.198
Houston General also argued that Chickasha was not entitled to cover-
age because Chickasha failed to present evidence of the liability limits of
the missing policies. The court held that evidence of limits was relevant
to the issue of indemnity but not to the duty to defend. Specifically, the
court stated that failure to present evidence of policy limits did not pre-
clude the duty to defend because the duty to defend was not subject to
the policy limits. 199 With respect to indemnity, the court agreed with
Houston General that evidence of the policy limits was required.200
Thus, the court held that the lower court erred in granting Houston Gen-
eral's no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the duty to defend
but upheld summary judgment for the insurer on its duty to indemnify.20'
5. Pollution Exclusion
a. Exclusions Failed to Preclude Coverage for Arsenic
Contamination Claims
In Chickasha,20 2 discussed above,20 3 the Dallas Court of Appeals held
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the in-
sured for pollution-related claims based on an exclusion within a number
of umbrella policies. The underlying plaintiffs' pollution claims con-
cerned arsenic routinely released by the insured into the environment
surrounding its gin through the burning of unusable portions of cotton
plants treated with the substance. The underlying plaintiffs alleged that
193. Id.
194. Id. at *4 (citing Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 484 S.W.2d 785, 788
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. Id. (citing Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1132 (5th
Cir. 1992); Bitumious Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir. 1996)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at *3.
198. Id. at *4.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *5.
202. Chickasha, 2002 WL 1792467, at *1.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 49-64 and notes 189-202.
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the arsenic made them ill at the time it was dispersed and damaged prop-
erty in the vicinity of the gin. The plaintiffs also claimed that they suf-
fered emotional distress, mental anguish and various chronic physical
aliments for years after the arsenic was released. 20 4
The subject umbrella policies were issued by Houston General between
1972 and 1986. The insuring agreement in the policies covered "personal
injury," "property damage," or "advertising liability" caused by an "oc-
currence. '20 5 The "policies defined 'personal injury' as meaning: (1) bod-
ily injury, sickness, disease, disability or shock, including death arising
therefrom, or, if arising out of the foregoing, mental anguish and mental
injury." 20 6
The pollution exclusion read as follows:
It is agreed that this policy does not apply to bodily injury or prop-
erty damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape
of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acid, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids
or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollu-
tants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.20 7
The court noted that the pollution exclusion did not necessarily pre-
clude coverage for all "personal injuries. '20 8 Rather, the exclusion only
precluded coverage for "bodily injury," which was only one component of
"personal injury." In addition to "bodily injury," the definition of "per-
sonal injury" included "sickness, disease, disability or shock, including
death arising therefrom, or, if arising out of the foregoing, mental anguish
and mental injury. '209 These additional components of "personal injury"
were not excluded by the pollution exclusion. The court determined that
the personal injuries alleged by the plaintiffs were not limited to "bodily
injury" and, therefore, some of plaintiffs' claims were not excluded by the
pollution exclusion. 210 Thus, the court found that summary judgment on
this issue was improper and reversed in favor of the insured.
The result in this case arises from the use of inconsistent terms in the
policies. The policies contained a relatively standard pollution exclusion,
which precluded coverage for bodily injury caused by the sudden and ac-
cidental release of pollutants. Similar pollution exclusions were common
in CGL policies at this time. However, Coverage A under such CGL
policies generally provided coverage for "bodily injury" (rather than
"personal injury") or "property damage" caused by an "occurrence."
The definition of "bodily injury" was similar to that portion of the defini-
tion of "personal injury" quoted above from the subject umbrella poli-
204. Chickasha, 2002 WL 1792467, at *1.
205. Id. at *5.
206. Id.






cies. Accordingly, the language of the pollution exclusion was consistent
with terminology used in standard CGL policies. However, by using the
term "personal injury" rather than "bodily injury" in the insuring clause
of the umbrella policies, an inconsistency between the insuring clause and
the pollution exclusion arose, significantly narrowing the scope of the pol-
lution exclusion.
b. Absolute Pollution Exclusion Applied to Insured's Spraying of
the Insured's Odor Eliminator
In Zaiontz v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,211 discussed in detail
above, 212 Zaiontz, an employee of the insured, Bio Zapp, alleged that he
sustained injuries while spraying Bio Zapp's "Smoke and Fire Odor Elim-
inator." TexPac argued that Zaiontz's injuries were excluded by the ab-
solute pollution exclusion. The exclusion precludes coverage for, "any
liability arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, disper-
sal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants. '213 Pollutants are
defined as including, "any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or
contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, [or] fumes.214"' Thus, TexPac
argued that Bio Zapp's "Smoke and Fire Odor Eliminator" was a pollu-
tant that after being "dispersed" caused Zaiontz's injuries.215
In its analysis, the court noted that the absolute pollution exclusion was
unambiguous under Texas law.216 Next, the court addressed Zaiontz's
argument that the "discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or es-
cape" required the pollutant to "leave the location of its placement. 217
The court rejected this argument, finding that the "discharge," "disper-
sal," or "release" were equivalent to "spray. '218 Because Zaiontz alleged
that he was injured after the "Smoke and Fire Odor Eliminator" was
sprayed into the interior of a plane, the court held that he was injured due
to the product's "discharge," "dispersal," or "release. '219 The court dis-
missed Zaiontz's reliance on Union Pacific, noting that case concerned an
exclusion involving the "sudden and accidental" release of a pollutant.220
Finally, the court rejected Zaiontz's argument that the pollution exclu-
sion "does not apply until the substance has moved from an area which it
does not pollute into an area which it does pollute."'221 The court held
that the plain language of exclusion's definition of "pollutant" generally
211. Zaiontz, 87 S.W.3d at 565.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 174-88.
213. Zaiontz, 87 S.W.3d at 571.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex.
1995)).
217. Id. at 571-72. Zaiontz cited Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 894 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied), in support of
his argument. Zaiontz, 87 S.W.3d at 572.
218. Zaiontz, 87 S.W.3d at 573.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 572-73 (citing Union Pac. Res. Co., 894 S.W.2d at 403).
221. Id. at 573.
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encompassed the fumes from the "Smoke and Fire Odor Eliminator."
The court also cited a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition that ordinary
or useful products could constitute pollutants even if they typically do not
inflict injury.222
B. AUTOMOBILE POLICIES
1. Coverage for "Diminished Value" of Covered Auto
Several cases were decided during the Survey period that addressed the
issue of whether a standard automobile policy provides coverage for the
diminished value of a covered automobile after the automobile has been
fully repaired. The split in Texas authority on this issue was not resolved
in 2002. The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals remains firmly con-
vinced that, as a matter of law, coverage for diminution in value does not
exist. The Beaumont and Dallas Courts of Appeals, however, reach the
opposite conclusion.
a. Beaumont Court of Appeals Finds Coverage for Diminished
Value
In Schaefer v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co.,223 the
Beaumont Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether coverage ex-
ists for diminished value of an insured's vehicle under a standard Texas
automobile policy. Gary Schaefer brought the case against several insur-
ers as a proposed class action on his own behalf and as a representative of
all similarly situated Texans.224 Schaefer moved for summary judgment
seeking to establish that diminished value was covered as a matter of law.
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company (AMM) filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that Schaefer was not enti-
tled to diminished value payments based upon a bulletin from the Texas
Department of Insurance (TDI).22 5 The trial court granted AMM's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment and denied Schaefer's motion. The
court then dismissed the plaintiff's claims against all defendants with
prejudice. 226
On appeal, the court only considered the issue of whether AMM's au-
tomobile policy covered Schaefer's diminution in value claim.227 The
court stated that it had previously addressed the issue in Smith v. Ameri-
can Fire and Casualty Co.228 In Smith the court found that there was
evidence that repairs to the damaged vehicle at issue did not restore it to
222. Id. (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. Nethery, 79 F.3d 473, 475-78 (5th Cir. 1996)).
223. Schaefer, 65 S.W.3d at 806.
224. Id. at 807.
225. Id. AMM relied on the decision from Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,
32 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), in support of its mo-
tion. Schaefer, 65 S.W.3d at 807.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 808.
228. Id. (citing Smith v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 242 S.W.2d 448, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1951, no writ)).
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its pre-damage market value. The court also held that the words "repair
and replace" found in the automobile liability policies include "a restora-
tion of the automobile to substantially the same condition in which it was
immediately prior to the collision. '229 The court pointed out that
"[n]either Smith nor the cases cited therein have been overruled by the
Texas Supreme Court. '230
Next, the court decided to follow the Houston Fourteenth Court of Ap-
peals' decision on this issue in Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,
which was relied upon by the trial court in its granting summary judgment
for AMM. 23 1 The court noted that the Carlton opinion cited Roberdeau
v. Indemnity Insurance Co., which ultimately held that a fact issue existed
as to whether repairs to the vehicle at issue restored the vehicle to its
former use.2 32 The Beaumont Court of Appeals stated, "We strongly dis-
agree that Roberdeau supports a holding that diminished value cannot be
recovered, 'as a matter of law." 233
Next, the court asserted that a number of cases since its decision in
Smith supported its precedent, including the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Superior Pontiac Co. v. Queen Insurance Co. of America.2 34 In
that case the jury found that the value of the insured's car after repair was
less than its value prior to the insured's automobile accident. The su-
preme court agreed that there was evidence to support the jury's findings,
"from which it follows that the repair sum tendered by [insurer] would
not compensate [plaintiff] for the loss she had suffered."23 5
The Schaefer court also cited Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v.
Underwood,236 which found that an insurer had materially breached its
obligations under an insurance policy by offering only $3,509.08 for re-
pairs to a car that had decreased in value by $6,500, even after repairs. 237
The Fidelity court noted that "once the vehicle is restored it will not be of
substantially the same value as that of the vehicle prior to the loss. ' '238
Thus, the court held that the trial court erred in holding that Schaefer
could not recover diminished value as a matter of law.239 The court re-
versed and remanded.240
229. Id. (quoting Smith, 242 S.W.2d at 453-54)).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 809 (citing Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 454).
232. Id. at 810 (referring to Roberdeau v. Indem. Ins. Co., 231 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing Superior Pontiac Co. v. Queen Ins. Co. of Am., 434 S.W. 340, 341 (Tex.
1968)).
235. Id. (quoting Superior Pontiac Co., 434 S.W.2d at 342).
236. Id. (citing Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Underwood, 791 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, no writ)).
237. Id. (citing Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 791 S.W.2d at 638, 643).
238. Id. (quoting Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 791 S.W.2d at 643).




b. Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals Rejects Diminished Value
Coverage
In Smither v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co.,241 the court
framed the issue as follows: "Is an insurer obligated to pay a first party
claim for the inherent diminished value of an insured vehicle following
adequate and complete repair of the damaged vehicle?"2 42 The court
noted that jurisdictions across the country had addressed this issue with
conflicting results.2 43
The insurer paid to repair damage to the insured's vehicle resulting
from an accident. After the repairs were made, the insured asserted a
second claim for "inherent diminished value." The insured sought cover-
age for the difference in the value of her car prior to the accident and its
value after the repairs were complete. When the insurer denied her
claim, the insured sued.244
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.245 The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer.2 46 The insured
appealed.
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals noted that a split exists in
Texas and national authority concerning whether an insurer must pay for
the diminished value of an insured's automobile after the automobile is
fully repaired. 247 While acknowledging this split, the court pointed out
that it had already ruled on the issue in Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insur-
ance Co.,248 which held that diminished value is not recoverable under a
standard Texas personal automobile insurance policy as a matter of law.
The court also cited Carlton for the proposition that "if the market value
of the vehicle, after full, adequate, and complete repair or replacement, is
diminished as a result of factors that are not subject to 'repair' or 're-
placement,' the insurer has no obligation to pay the diminution in
value. " 249
The court noted that until Schaefer v. American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Co., it was the only court in Texas to have addressed this pre-
cise issue under the language of the standard Texas personal automobile
insurance policy. The court recognized that, in Schaefer, the Beaumont
Court of Appeals rejected the Houston court's prior precedent and re-
fused to hold that diminished value was not covered as a matter of law.250
The Houston court criticized the Schaefer holding, stating that authority
on which Schaefer relied was distinguishable because those cases were
241. Smither, 76 S.W.3d at 719.
242. Id. at 720.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 720-21.
246. Id. at 721.
247. Id.
248. Id. (citing Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 465).
249. Id. (quoting Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 465).
250. Id. at 722 (citing Schaefer, 65 S.W.3d at 810).
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decided on tort principles, rather than contract principles. 251 The court
accused the Schaefer court of failing to address the meaning of the policy
language as it now exists. 252 The court suggested that this was the differ-
ence between the Schaefer court's analysis and the Houston court's analy-
sis in Carlton, in which the court said it applied "pure contract analysis in
deciding whether diminished value was a covered loss."'253 In Carlton,
the court found that the "repair and replace" limitation of liability under
the standard policy form concerned the amount necessary to return the
damaged vehicle to "substantially the same physical, operating, and
mechanical condition as existed immediately before the loss. ''254 Based
upon this analysis, the court concluded that the standard Texas Automo-
bile Policy did not cover inherent diminution in value as a matter of
law.255
Finally, the court noted that, since the decision in Carlton, a number of
other jurisdictions have addressed the same issue and have relied on Carl-
ton as persuasive authority against inherent diminution in value coverage
under standard automobile liability policies. 2 56 The court followed its
own precedent and concluded that, as a matter of law, the insured was
not entitled to recover inherent diminished value under the unambiguous
terms of the standard Texas personal automobile insurance policy. 257
c. Dallas Court of Appeals Finds Coverage for Diminished Value
In Bailey v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co.,258 the Dallas
Court of Appeals addressed "inherent diminished value" coverage under
a Texas automobile insurance policy. The insured's vehicle was damaged
as a result of a serious accident. Their insurer paid to repair the damages;
however, the repaired vehicle was worth $9,000 less than it was before the
accident.2 59 After the insurer refused to pay for the vehicle's diminished
value, the insured filed suit asserting that Progressive had failed to repair
or replace their property with another of like kind and quality.2 60 The
insurer moved for summary judgment arguing that it had met its contrac-
tual requirements by repairing the vehicle and that diminished value was
not recoverable under its policy. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the insurer, and the insured appealed.2 61
The Dallas Court of Appeals relied on its holding in an earlier case
involving a flood-damaged vehicle.2 62 In that case the court said that it
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id . at 723.
254. Id. at 723-24 (citing Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 464-65).
255. Id. at 724 (citing Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 564).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 725.
258. Bailey, 78 S.W.3d at 708.
259. Id. at 710.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 711 (citing Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 791 S.W.2d at 635).
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had held that the insurer was required to restore the damaged vehicle to
"'substantially the same value as that of the vehicle prior to the loss.' 263
The court's ruling in Fidelity was based upon policy language stating that
the insurer would have to pay what it cost to repair or replace the dam-
aged automobile with one of "like kind and quality. '264
The court noted that the Beaumont Court of Appeals had recently re-
lied on the Fidelity opinion in holding that inherent diminished value was
covered under a Texas automobile liability policy.265 The court also
noted that the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals had reached con-
trary results in Smither v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co. 266
and in Carlton v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. 267 Like the Beaumont
court, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the precedent from Houston,
noting that it conflicted with its own precedent and the weight of Texas
authority on the issue. 268
Finally, the court rejected the insurer's reliance on a Texas Department
of Insurance (TDI) bulletin which construed the language of the automo-
bile policy as not providing coverage for diminished value.269 The court
found that TDI's interpretation of insurance statutes had to be given
great weight;270 however, TDI's interpretation of contractual language
deserves no such consideration. 271 The court reversed and remanded.
2. Waiver of UIM and PIP Coverage
Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez272 re-
placed and modified the court's previous opinion in this case, 273 which
was discussed in last year's Survey. 274 The court addressed three issues:
(1) whether a spouse who is the applicant for an automobile insurance
policy, but not expressly named under the policy, can waive PIP and UM
coverage for the insured; 275 (2) whether an insured is deemed to be occu-
pying a vehicle when he is underneath the vehicle performing repairs;276
and (3) whether the insured was "struck by" his unscheduled vehicle
when a vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist collided with the in-
263. Id. (quoting Fid. & Cas. Co. of N. Y., 791 S.W.2d at 641).
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing Schaefer, 65 S.W.3d at 806).
266. Id. (citing Smither, 76 S.W.3d at 719).
267. Id. (citing Carlton, 32 S.W.3d at 454).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 712.
270. Id. (citing State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. 1994)).
271. Id. at 712-13 (citing Balandran v. Safeco, 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1998)).
272. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, no pet.).
273. Id. at 454 (discussing the withdrawal and replacement of its opinion in this matter
on November 15, 2001).
274. See J. Price Collins & Lara K. Forde, Insurance Law, 55 SMU L. REV. 1155, 1194-
96 (discussing Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, No. 03-01-00150-CV (Tex.
App.-Austin Nov. 15, 2001) (not designated for publication), 2001 WL 1422581, with-
drawn, 81 S.W.3d 252 (Tex App.-Austin 2002, no pet.)).
275. Sanchez, 81 S.W.3d at 458-61.
276. Id. at 455-58.
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sured's vehicle causing it to collapse on the insured.277
The insured, Mr. Sanchez, "was injured when an uninsured motorist hit
a truck owned by [him] but not scheduled as a covered vehicle on his
automobile insurance policy. ' 278 "At the time of the accident, Sanchez
was underneath the truck working on the gas tank hose. '279 Sanchez
sought "uninsured motorist coverage (UIM) and personal injury protec-
tion coverage (PIP)" from his insurer.280 The insurer filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to pay for
Sanchez's injuries, and Sanchez counterclaimed.
The insurer sought summary judgment on several grounds including
that Sanchez was "occupying" his truck at the time of the accident.281
The trial court granted summary judgment on this ground.28 2 The insurer
also moved for summary judgment on the ground that Sanchez's wife re-
jected PIP and UIM benefits on the application for Sanchez's insurance,
which constituted, the insurer argued, a rejection of PIP and UIM bene-
fits by Sanchez.283 Sanchez claimed that the rejection was not effective
because "his wife was not the 'named insured."' 284 The trial court denied
the insurer's motion on this ground. The last summary judgment ground
asserted by the insurer was that Sanchez was struck by his unscheduled
vehicle, precluding coverage pursuant to the owned-vehicle exclusion. 285
The trial court did not rule on this ground.286 Sanchez appealed; the in-
surer cross-appealed. 287
On appeal, the court addressed the effect of Sanchez' wife's rejection
of coverage for PIP and UIM coverage. Initially, the court agreed with
the insurer that Sanchez was not entitled to PIP and UIM benefits be-
cause his wife effectively waived coverage. On reconsideration, the court
determined that PIP and UIM coverage had not been waived. Sanchez
argued his wife's rejection of coverage was invalid because the Texas In-
surance Code only permits an insured "named under the policy" to reject
PIP or UIM coverage. 288 Moreover, the rejection must be in writing.289
Sanchez further argued that the court's previous ruling had incorrectly
allowed the policy's definition of who is an insured to control over the
Insurance Code's language. 290
Old American responded that its policy defines "you" and "your" as
277. Id. at 461-62.
278. Id. at 454.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 454-55.







288. Id. at 458 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06(1) (Vernon 1981)).




the named insured and the named insured's spouse.2 91 Old American
also argued that the Texas Insurance Code did not limit the rejection of
PIP and UIM coverage to the "named insured. 12 92 Thus, the insurer con-
tended that the rejection was valid.
The court found Old American's argument to be inaccurate. The Texas
Insurance Code provides that all automobile insurance policies should
provide both uninsured motorist and personal injury protection coverage
except where "'any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage
in writing .. '.. ,,,93 The statute's language does extend beyond the
"named insured;" however, the universe of people who may reject cover-
age is limited to individuals specifically named in the policy.
Therefore, this time, the court sided with Sanchez. The court agreed
that it had inappropriately applied policy language to the statute's man-
date that only an insured named under the policy may reject PIP, and
UIM coverage. The court noted that the legislature drafted the provi-
sions in question intending to provide broad PIP and UIM coverage. 294
The court also found that Texas case law has generally interpreted PIP
and UIM clauses in favor of insureds.2 95 The court held that the statute
required that the person rejecting coverage be expressly named as an in-
sured somewhere in the policy.2 96 Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to grant the insurer's motion for summary judgment on
this issue.297
3. Owned Vehicle Exclusion-Meaning of "Occupying"
In Old American County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanchez,298 the
court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the "owned vehicle"
exclusion precluded PIP and UIM coverage because he was "occupying"
his vehicle. On appeal Sanchez argued that "occupying" a vehicle did not
include lying under it while having contact only with its gas hose. 299 Old
American responded that "contact" with the vehicle was enough to sat-
isfy the definition of "occupying," which meant "in, upon, getting in, on,
out or off" the vehicle. 300 Based on that definition, the court determined
that Sanchez's claims would be barred unless he was found to be "upon"
the vehicle. 301 Although the term "upon" was not defined in the policy,
the court noted that under Texas law, the term suggests that one needs to
be supported by an object to be deemed "upon" the object. The court
declined to broaden the term "upon" to include "touching a vehicle from
291. Id. at 459.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 458 nn.5-6 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 5.06-.1(1), 5.06-3 (Vernon 1981).
294. Id. at 459.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 460.
297. Id. at 462-63.
298. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 81 S.W.3d at 452.





below while resting on the ground beneath the vehicle." 302 Therefore,
because Sanchez was not "occupying" the vehicle, the court sustained
Sanchez's appeal on this issue. 30 3
4. Owned Vehicle Exclusion-Meaning of "Struck By"
The Sanchez court next addressed the insurer's argument that the
"struck by" provision of the "owned vehicle exclusion" precluded PIP
and UIM coverage for Sanchez. The "owned vehicle exclusion" pre-
cluded coverage if the insured was "struck by" an unscheduled vehicle
owned by the insured. The insurer asserted that Sanchez's vehicle
"struck" him when it collapsed on him and, therefore, PIP and UIM cov-
erage was excluded under the owned vehicle exclusion. 30 4
The court found that based on Texas precedent "a passive vehicle can-
not be the striking force in a collision. '30 5 The court also noted that
Texas courts have held that the "object supplying the striking or 'causa-
tive' force does not have to directly contact the insured in order for" cov-
erage to apply.30 6 The court decided that Sanchez was injured by a
vehicle set in motion by another vehicle, which was not his own and held
that the "owned vehicle" exclusion did not bar coverage.
5. "Motor Vehicle Accident"
In Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sturrock,30 7 the court
addressed what constitutes a "motor vehicle accident." The case was ini-
tiated by an insured against his automobile insurer for its refusal to pay
Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. The insured claimed that he
was entitled to the benefits for injuries he sustained when his foot became
entangled as he was exiting his pickup truck. The insurer denied cover-
age on the basis that the insured had not been involved in a "motor vehi-
cle accident." The insurer based its denial on the facts that no other
vehicle or person was involved in his injuries and that his car was turned
off at the time he became entangled. 30 8
To determine what constitutes a "motor vehicle accident," the court
looked at a number of Texas cases dealing with automobile liability
claims involving only the insured's vehicle. 30 9 The court concluded that
coverage for single-vehicle "accidents" hinges upon whether the vehicle is
"only incidentally involved and provides the 'mere situs' for an accident
that could have occurred anywhere," or where the injury-producing act
302. Id. at 458.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 461.
305. Id. (citing Gallup v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 515 S.W.2d 249, 249 (Tex. 1974); Houston
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kahn, 359 S.W.2d 892, 892 (Tex. 1962)).
306. Id. at 461-62 (citing Latham v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 482 S.W.2d 655,
657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
307. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sturrock, 65 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2001, pet. granted).
308. Id. at 765.
309. Id. at 765-67.
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"involved the use of a vehicle as a vehicle. '310 The court then noted that
using a pickup truck necessitates "mounting and dismounting" the vehi-
cle.311 Moreover, the court held that a "motor vehicle accident" did not
require a physical impact but merely an injury with a causative connec-
tion to the insured's vehicle. 312 Thus, the court held that the insured's
entanglement in his vehicle was a "motor vehicle accident. '313
6. Workers' Compensation: Subrogation Rights Do Not Extend to UIM
Claim
In Liberty Mutual v. Kinser,314 "Michael Kinser was injured in an auto-
mobile accident while in the course and scope of his employment for
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company" ("SWB"). 315 After the acci-
dent, SWB's workers' compensation carrier, Liberty Mutual, began pay-
ing Kinser's medical bills.316 Eventually, the other driver was determined
to be responsible for the accident. That driver's insurance carrier, Farm-
ers, tendered its policy limits of $25,000 in a check jointly payable to Kin-
ser and Liberty Mutual. 317 Liberty Mutual applied the $25,000 toward
the satisfaction of its lien.
In addition, Kinser had his own uninsured motorist (UIM) coverage
through State Farm Automobile Insurance Company. UIM policy limits
were $50,000. Because Liberty Mutual paid workers' compensation ben-
efits in excess of the $25,000 Kinser recovered from Farmers, Liberty Mu-
tual sought to recover from Kinser's uninsured motorist carrier, pursuant
to its subrogation rights. Kinser contested Liberty Mutual's right to re-
ceive his UIM benefits. 318 Accordingly, State Farm interpled a portion of
the UIM benefits to the court's registry. Liberty Mutual and Kinser filed
answers and cross-claims against each other. The trial court subsequently
granted summary judgment in favor of Kinser. 319
On appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals acknowledged that in-
surers have subrogation rights under the workers' compensation stat-
ute.320 The statute allows a carrier to "enforce the liability of [a] third
party in the name of the injured employee."'321 The court reviewed hold-
ings by sister courts in Employers Casualty Co. v. Dyess and Texas Work-










319. Id. at 73.
320. Id.
321. Id. (quoting TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.001(b) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2002)).
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ers' Compensation Insurance Facility v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.322
In Dyess, "the Amarillo court concluded that the 'clear wording of the
statute' did not support the UIM carrier's position that the workers' com-
pensation carrier is only subrogated to the claimant's rights against third
party tortfeasors." 323 "The Amarillo court held that the statutory right of
subrogation applies to any parties liable for a claimant's injuries, regard-
less of whether that liability arose in tort or contract, and any contractual
provision conflicting with that statutory right was invalid. '324 In Texas
Workers' Comp. Insurance Facility, the Houston First District Court of
Appeals followed Dyess, noting "that the subrogation statute did not ex-
pressly limit the workers compensation carrier's right to claims against
third party tortfeasors. '325
In analyzing the issue, the Kinser court found that statutory language
surrounding what constitutes a "third party" was more clear in earlier
statutory language. Prior to recodification, the statute referred to the lia-
bility of "that other person" instead of a "third party. '32 6 The court went
on to note that the term "third party," when read in isolation, extended
beyond tortfeasors. However, the court said that "[s]ection 417.001(a)
modifies or limits the 'third party' to a 'third party who is or becomes
liable to pay damages."' 327 Thus, the court held: "[A] carrier is only enti-
tled to subrogation against damages paid to an injured employee by a
third party who is or becomes liable to pay damages. '328 ,
Next, the court addressed Kinser's position that the subrogation provi-
sion did not apply in his situation "because State Farm was liable for con-
tractual benefits not damages. '329 Kinser "maintain[ed] that this
contractual right to receive benefits is distinguishable from the right to
recover damages. '330
In addressing the distinction between "damages" and "benefits," the
court cited Texas case law holding that "'[a]n award of damages is de-
fined as the sum of money the law awards as pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a
consequence of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act."' 33'
The court then noted that the Texas Supreme Court had recognized a
difference between damages awarded by a jury and benefits paid under
322. Id. at 75 (discussing Employers Cas. Co. v. Dyess, 957 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1997, pet. denied); Texas Workers' Comp. Ins. Facility v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
994 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).
323. Id. (citing Dyess, 957 S.W.2d at 889).
324. Id. (citing Dyess, 957 S.W.2d at 891).
325. Id. (citing Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Facility, 994 S.W.2d at 925).
326. Id. at 77-78.








an uninsured motorist policy. 332 The court also distinguished the hold-
ings in Dyess and Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Facility on the
basis that the UIM policies at issue in those cases "were acquired and
maintained by the claimant's employer, not by the claimant. '333 Thus, the
court held "that the term 'damages' as used in section 417.001(a) does not
include" uninsured motorist benefits. 334 The court affirmed the lower
court's judgment on behalf of the insured.
C. DIRECTOR & OFFICER LIABILITY: LATE NOTICE
In Federal Insurance Co. v. CompUSA, Inc.,335 Judge Fitzwater ad-
dressed a declaratory "judgment action involving a claims-made" liability
policy for directors and officers. The sole issue before the court was
whether the insured's failure to comply with the policy requirement that
it give its insurer notice of any claim "as soon as practicable" precluded
its right to indemnity in the underlying case. 336 The court held that the
insured failed to give the required notice and that the insurer did not
have to show "actual prejudice" under a claims-made policy in order to
deny the claim.337
Turning to the facts, the underlying lawsuit was filed in January 2000 by
COC Services Ltd. (COC) against CompUSA. In the suit, COC alleged
that CompUSA "had breached an agreement to form a joint venture"
with COC "to expand CompUSA's personal computer business into
Mexico. ' 338 COC filed an amended petition in February 2000, specifi-
cally naming James F. Halpin, CompUSA's President and CEO, as a de-
fendant. COC's allegations against Halpin included "fraud, tortious
interference, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. 3 39 Both Halpin and
CompUSA jointly answered in March 2000.340
In its answer, and throughout the litigation, CompUSA expressed that
it viewed the lawsuit as frivolous. In spite of the insured's assessment of
the lawsuit, the case went to trial and a jury returned a verdict in favor of
COC.341 The jury awarded the underlying plaintiff $90 million against
Halpin and the other defendants. The jury also awarded "COC $175.5
million dollars against Halpin in exemplary damages. '342
Six days after the verdict, and eleven months after COC first effected
service of process, CompUSA notified Federal, its liability carrier, of the
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COC lawsuit and verdict. 343 The court of appeals noted that this evi-
dence was undisputed and that the letter was the first formal notice by
the insured to Federal concerning the lawsuit.
After receiving notice, Federal denied the claim and sought a declara-
tory judgment from the Northern District of Texas that it was not obli-
gated to indemnify the insureds due to their failure to give notice of the
claim "as soon as practicable. '344 In addressing Federal's declaratory
judgment argument, the court focused on precedent concerning what
constitutes notice "as soon as practicable," the sufficiency of the notice of
the actual claim, and whether an insurer must demonstrate actual
prejudice stemming from the absence of the required notice.345
Concerning the "as soon as practicable" requirement, the court noted
that the insurance policy read in relevant part:
The Insureds shall, as a condition precedent to exercising their rights
under this coverage section, give to the Company written notice as
soon as practicable of any Claim made against any of them for a
Wrongful Act.346
Moreover, the policy's notice clause required any notice to be sent to a
specific address. The court next found that Texas courts have held that
"as soon as practicable" is equivalent to "within a reasonable time. '347
The court stated that "[w]hen the relevant facts are undisputed, the ques-
tion whether notice was given 'as soon as practicable' or 'within a reason-
able time' is a question of law."'348
Since it was undisputed that formal notification was not given to Fed-
eral until February 14, 2001, the court held that as a matter of law the
notice was not given within a reasonable time. The court based this rul-
ing on a prior district court opinion that discussed two Texas Supreme
Court cases addressing what constitutes notice "as soon as practica-
ble."'349 In those cases the supreme court held that delays of 107 days and
thirty-two days, respectively, were too long.350
Next, the court addressed whether Federal's "actual" notice was suffi-
cient. Concerning this point, the insured contended "that Federal re-
ceived actual notice of the COC suit during March 2000, when a Federal
underwriter" read a Form 10-Q on CompUSA's web site concerning the
COC suit.35' The court rejected this argument, holding that the under-
writer's knowledge of the Form 10-Q did not "relieve the Insureds of
343. Id.
344. Id. at *2.
345. Id. at *3.
346. Id. at *2.
347. Id. at *3 (citing Chicago Ins. Co. v. W. World Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 3-96-CV-3179R,
1998 WL 51363 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 1998)).
348. Id. (citing Chicago Ins. Co., 1998 WL 51363, at *2).
349. Id. (citing Chicago Ins. Co., 1998 WL 51363, at *3 (citing Allen v. W. Alliance Ins.
Co., 162 Tex. 572, 349 S.W.2d 590, 594 (1961); Klein v. Century Lloyd's, 154 Tex. 160, 275





their obligation to comply with the notice" requirement, which was a con-
dition precedent for coverage. 352
Finally, the court held that Federal did not have to demonstrate that it
suffered "actual prejudice" from the insured's failure to give the required
notice. The court found that, under Texas law, the effect of an insured's
non-compliance with its policy's notice requirements depends whether
the policy is "claims-made" or "occurrence-based. '353 The insureds had
argued that the policy was essentially an occurrence-based policy, be-
cause of an endorsement that created an extended recording period. The
court, however, rejected this argument and held that, while the endorse-
ment "allow[ed] certain claims made after the policy period has con-
cluded to be treated as claims made within the policy period," the
provision was still "fully consistent with the Policy's express language de-
claring it to have been written on a 'claims made basis.' 354
The court agreed with the insured that Texas law requires an insurer to
show actual prejudice before it can deny coverage based upon ineffective
notice under an occurrence-based policy. The court stated that the rea-
son for this requirement was that notice under an occurrence policy no-
tice is "subsidiary" to the event that actually triggers coverage.3 5 5 The
court then stated that claims-made policies differ from occurrence poli-
cies in that the notice itself triggers coverage. Due to this distinction, the
court held that it was proper to strictly interpret the notice requirements
of a claims-made policy.356 Thus, since Federal's policy at issue contained
no actual prejudice requirement for denying a claim due to ineffective
notice, the insurer did not have to show actual prejudice. Based upon
these findings, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal,
finding that it had no duty to indemnify the insured.357
352. Id. at *3-4 (citing FDIC v. Barham, 995 F.2d 600, 604, n.9 (5th Cir. 1993)).
353. Id. at *4.
354. Id. at *5.
355. Id. (citing Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Corp., 174 F.3d
653, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Texas law)).
356. Id. at *4.
357. Id. at *6.
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